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Abstract
Finance is important for development. However, the Asian financial
crisis of 1997–1998 and the global financial crisis of 2008 highlighted
the serious risks associated with financial liberalization and excessive
innovation. East Asia’s strong focus on economic growth has necessitated a careful balancing of the benefits of financial liberalization and innovation against the very real risks inherent in financial sector development. This Article examines the role of regulatory, legal, and institutional infrastructure in supporting both financial development and limiting
the risk of financial crises. The Article then addresses a series of issues
with particular developmental significance in the region: trade finance,
mortgage markets, SME finance, non-bank finance, and mobile financial
services.
I. INTRODUCTION
Financial innovation has been defined as both the “technological
advances [that] facilitate access to information, trading[,] and means of
payment . . . and to the emergence of new financial instruments and services, new forms of [organization,] and more developed and complete
financial markets.” 1 While financial innovation has traditionally been
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1. Eugenio Domingo Solans, Member of the Governing Council and of the Exec. Bd. of Eur.
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associated with economic growth and development, the financial crises
of the past decade have revealed the significant risks posed by innovations in the absence of adequate regulation. It is now clear that financial
regulation must balance risk with innovation in order to maintain financial stability and support economic growth. This pragmatic approach to
financial regulation was adopted in East Asia following the Asian financial crisis and is arguably one of the greatest financial innovations of the
past decade. It is essential that such an approach be maintained in East
Asia, and the West should be encouraged to look to and learn from the
successes in East Asia as it attempts to recover from the global and European financial crises.
In the two decades prior to 2007, financial innovation was viewed
in most countries as a desirable objective worthy of policy support. Institutional development was particularly encouraged—specifically law reform, deregulation, and financial liberalization. During this period, finance in Asia was generally viewed as suffering from a lack of financial
innovation, with repressed markets and underdeveloped institutional infrastructure, particularly in the realm of law and regulation.
Since 2007 and the onset of the global and “Eurozone” financial
crises, the general view of financial innovation has become much more
nuanced. Financial innovation is no longer seen as universally desirable,
particularly as many innovations of the preceding decades played a central role in the global financial crisis. Financial systems that had previously been characterized as suffering from excessive regulation and insufficient innovation, such as those of Canada and Australia, performed
far better during the crisis than the highly innovative financial systems in
the United Kingdom and United States. Likewise, while the financial
systems of East Asia had been viewed as insufficiently innovative, they
suffered relatively minor financial crises in comparison to the United
States and Western Europe. As a result, views of financial innovation
have changed significantly in a short period of time.
This Article considers the role of financial innovation in the past,
present, and future development of East Asia. It begins with the question
of whether, in fact, East Asia can be characterized historically as suffering from a lack of financial innovation. While East Asia has certainly
been the source of many significant financial innovations historically, it
is most commonly seen as having generally lacked innovation in the peInnovation, 2009 OECD J.: FIN. MARKET TRENDS 91; WORLD ECON. FORUM, RETHINKING
FINANCIAL INNOVATION: REDUCING NEGATIVE OUTCOMES WHILE RETAINING THE BENEFITS (2012)
(Switz.), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FS_RethinkingFinancialInnovation_
Report_2012.pdf; Definition of Financial Innovation, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/Ter
m?term=financial-innovation (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
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riod since the World War II. We argue that this characterization is not
entirely accurate and that, in fact, East Asia has continued to innovate in
finance during this period. At the same time, perhaps one of its most important innovations has been an approach to finance that is both cautious
and focused primarily on supporting real economic activity, particularly
in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. This pragmatic
approach to financial innovation is largely responsible for the region’s
resilience during the global financial crisis.
From this background, we consider financial innovation in East
Asia’s future development. Given that finance in the individual economies of the region tends to be dominated by large domestic banks that
often focus their lending on large firms, there is a clear need for alternative sources of funding. This is the area where financial innovation matters most for East Asia going forward. Specifically, we identify five areas where East Asia needs to focus on supporting innovation in order to
maintain financial stability and also support economic growth and development: trade finance, mortgage markets, SME finance, non-bank finance, and mobile financial services. In each of these areas, innovation
based on local circumstances and needs is vital to support financial stability and growth across the region.
II. FINANCIAL INNOVATION IN EAST ASIA’S DEVELOPMENT
Financial market professionals and various scholars have frequently
characterized finance in East Asia as being insufficiently innovative. 2
Under this characterization, East Asia has been a “taker” of financial innovations from the West, usually receiving new financial strategies and
techniques third-hand after their development in the United States and
successful spread to Western Europe. Only at that point did Western financial institutions and professionals export successful techniques to
East Asia in search of new opportunities for profit. That characterization,
however, is historically inaccurate.
A. Financial Innovation in Asia’s Early Development
The Asian economies, particularly prior to the industrial revolution
in Western Europe, were the source of some of the most significant historical financial innovations: Marine insurance and ship finance came
from the Phoenicians, as did, arguably, early forms of venture capital and
corporations; agricultural futures and paper currency were derived from
China; group lending and insurance pools were common across the re2. For detailed discussion and analysis, see QIAO LIU ET AL., FINANCE IN ASIA: INSTITUTIONS,
REGULATION AND POLICY ch. 7 (2013).
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gion and likely originated from China;3 and bills of exchange, hawala,
and covered bonds from the Islamic world and the Ottoman Empire further exemplify financial innovation originating from Asia.4 As such, it is
clearly incorrect to suggest that Asia, including East Asia, has always
suffered from a lack of financial innovation and has always been a taker
of financial innovations from Western markets. In fact, many of these
early innovations, which originated in Asia, were central to the institutional framework that supported and funded the industrial revolution in
Western Europe.5
Even in the second half of the twentieth century, Asia has been the
source of a number of significant financial innovations. Three examples
warrant particular attention: the developmental state, microfinance, and
Islamic finance—all of which are important Asian financial innovations.
The model of the developmental state, pioneered by Japan and exported across the region, comprises the repression of finance to mobilize
financial resources to support export industries and thus to support economic growth and development.6 There are very significant limitations to
the model, particularly as economies reach higher levels of development
and fuller integration with the global economy and financial system.
These limitations have been highlighted dramatically by Japan’s twodecade financial malaise and the Asian financial crisis that commenced
in 1997. Nevertheless, the model has been vital to the region’s successful
development. Likewise, the centrality of finance to the model is clearly
an innovation, a very successful and influential one, albeit one with important limitations.
Microfinance emerged from Bangladesh as an Asian innovation and
has spread around the world.7 It is one of the most influential developments in finance in the past thirty years. The focus microfinance puts on
lending small amounts to the poor to support economic activity and its
use of a range of social techniques, such as group lending, to ensure repayment is an innovation clearly related to the actual conditions and
needs in the region. Likewise, the region—particularly Malaysia and Pakistan—has contributed greatly to innovations involving Islamic fi3. The History of Insurance, QUADRIS INS. BROKERS, http://www.quadrisinsurance.co.uk/
insurance_history.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
4. Matthias Schramm & Markus Taube, Evolution and Institutional Foundation of the Hawala
Financial System, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 405 (2003).
5. See generally PRASANNAN PARTHASARATHI, WHY EUROPE GREW RICH AND ASIA DID NOT:
GLOBAL ECONOMIC DIVERGENCE 1600–1850 (2011).
6. LIU ET AL., supra note 2, at ch. 1–2.
7. BEATRIZ ARMENDÁRIZ DE AGHION & JONATHAN MORDUCH, THE ECONOMICS OF
MICROFINANCE (2005); Kevin Davis, Financing Development: Microfinance–Background, N.Y.
UNIV. SCH. L., INST. INT’L L. & JUST., http://www.iilj.org/courses/FDMicrofinanceBackground.asp
(last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
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nance,8 which have been exported across Asia and also to Western markets.9
In addition, other areas of Asia–Pacific financial innovation include
pensions, where Australia and Singapore are world leaders;10 stored value cards or e-money, where innovations in Hong Kong have spread
around the world;11 and Internet and mobile banking, and financial services, where developed regions in East Asia lead the world.12
While Asia has not generated as much innovation in the past seventy years as North America and Western Europe, the region has nonetheless produced globally significant financial innovations that have contributed to real economic growth and development. It is thus clearly incorrect to characterize finance in Asia as lacking in innovation.
B. The Limits of Financial Innovation
In an era of globalization and highly interdependent markets, finance matters. From the most advanced leading economies to emerging
and developing nations, finance is viewed as a vehicle for development
and economic stability. Supported by a growing body of literature, a consensus exists that a well functioning financial sector is a primary driver
of growth.
At the same time, finance, as emphatically demonstrated by the
Asian, global, and Eurozone financial crises, is not without its risks.
These crises have raised important questions about the limits of financial
innovation for economic growth and development. Economic researchers
Jeanneney and Kpodar argue that “financial development helps reduce
poverty indirectly by stimulating growth[,] and directly by facilitating
transactions and allowing the poor to benefit from financial services
(primarily savings products) that increase their income . . . and enhance
8. Islamic finance is a financial system that operates according to Sharia Law. While Islamic
law allows for a free-market economy, Islamic finance prohibits certain activities such as gambling,
charging interest, investing in prohibited industries, and dealing in uncertainty-based transactions.
9 . NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: LOCAL
PRACTICE, GLOBAL IMPACT (2008), available at http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/
pdf/Preview/PR08_IF_preview.pdf; Mercy A. Kuo, Islamic Finance in Southeast Asia: Strategic
Context and Trends, 3 J. ISLAMIC ECON. BANKING & FIN. 5 (2009); Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of
the Cent. Bank of Malaysia, Speech at the Brunei Darussalem Islamic Investment Summit, Regulatory and Governance for Islamic Finance (June 19, 2013), available at http://www.bis.org/review/
r130627b.pdf.
10. Yuwei Hu, Growth of Asian Pension Assets: Implications for Financial and Capital Markets 3 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 360, 2012), available at http://www.adbi.org/
files/2012.05.31.wp360.growth.asian.pension.assets.pdf.
11. Winnie Nip, E-Money in Hong Kong, ANALYST, Fall 2006, at 9, available at
http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/analyst/content/issues/analystFall2006_EM2.pdf.
12. Alfred Romann, Banking on the Digital Age, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 2, 2013, 8:15 AM),
http://www.chinadailyasia.com/business/2013-08/02/content_15081264.html.
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their ability to undertake profitable . . . activities.” 13 They conclude,
however, that during some stages financial development may “demonstrably undermine[] poverty reduction because the poor are generally
more vulnerable than the rich to unstable and malfunctioning financial
institutions . . . .”14 Thus, increases in financial development and activity
and in moves to more open markets may, in some countries, increase the
disparity between the rich and the poor and positively harm the poor.15
While finance is important in the process of industrialization, an
unbridled financial sector does not necessarily lead to continuing economic growth and prosperity. In Paul Volcker’s words, “I wish that
somebody would give me some shred of neutral evidence about the relationship between financial innovation recently and the growth of the
economy, just one shred of information.”16 While in our view this position is too extreme, at the same time, post-crisis research does indicate
that in finance more is not necessarily better. In an important recent
study, Cecchetti and Kharroubi examined the impact of finance on
growth and development at the aggregate level and found that mature,
sophisticated economies get to a point where greater volumes and sophistication in banking, credit, and other financial tools become associated
with lower economic growth.17 Cecchetti and Kharroubi found that because the finance sector competes with other sectors for scarce resources,
rapid growth of finance can have an adverse impact on aggregate real
growth.18 Essentially, rapid growth of a financial sector can serve as a
drag on an economy and shift resource allocation and distribution in suboptimal ways.19
Finance in the most advanced nations today utilizes increasingly
sophisticated and complex financial products, which are not always
transparent and are often difficult to source and assess. Meanwhile, de13. Sylviane Gullaumont Jeanneney & Kangni Kpodar, Financial Development and Poverty
Reduction: Can There Be a Benefit Without a Cost? 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
08/62, 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp0862.pdf.
14. Id.
15 . ROSS P. BUCKLEY & DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURE (2011); see also Philip Arestis & Asena Caner,
Financial Liberalization and Poverty: Channels of Influence (The Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper
No. 411, 2004), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp411.pdf
16. Paul Volcker, Think More Boldly, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704825504574586330960597134.html. In the same piece, Volcker wrote
the words one so often hears quoted: “[T]he most important financial innovation that I have seen the
past 20 years is the automatic teller machine.” Id.
17. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Enisse Kharroubi, Reassessing the Impact of Finance on Growth
(Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 381, 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/work381.pdf.
18. Id. at 1.
19. Id. at 13.
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veloping states continue their integration into the global markets while
being challenged by capacity and governance issues. This is the context
for our examination of the benefits of increased financial activity and its
likely impact on long-term economic development. This also highlights
East Asia’s most important financial innovation since the Asian financial
crisis: a pragmatic and cautious approach to financial innovation and development, focusing not on encouraging innovation for innovation’s sake
but, rather, seeking to support the needs of the real economy through financial stability and economic growth.
III. FINANCIAL INNOVATION IN EAST ASIA’S FUTURE
Today’s financial innovations are largely a by-product of financial
liberalization, which itself was a response to the financial repression of
the 1970s and 1980s in many developing countries. Financial repression
included state ownership of financial institutions, government control
and distortion of interest rate pricing, and capital controls to restrict asset
transfers.20 Such measures came to be seen as questionable given their
poor financial and economic results, inefficient allocation of resources,
and high costs—especially associated with the proliferation of nonperforming loans (NPLs). Globalization thus supported the move to financial liberalization.21
Liberalization involves the broad deregulation of financial markets.22 This process is typically accompanied by easier and faster capital
flows, decreased regulatory scrutiny, and an increase in the types of financial instruments used or traded. Liberalization tends to lead to increasingly creative and innovative financial products that feed investors’
demands for higher yields.23 In the wake of the increasing frequency of
cross-border financial crises over the past four decades, questions have
emerged concerning the relationships between liberalization, economic
development, and risk. In moving away from financial repression, liber20. For a detailed analysis of the term “financial repression” and its impact on growth, see
EDWARD S. SHAW, FINANCIAL DEEPENING IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1973). In contrast, Reinhart and Sbrancia argue that the aftermath of the global financial crisis created optimal conditions
where financial repression would be effective in reducing debt. See Carmen M. Reinhart & M. Belen
Sbrancia, The Liquidation of Government Debt (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
16893, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16893.pdf?new_window=1.
21. THE WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990S: LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF
REFORM 203–38 (2005).
22. Graciela Laura Kaminsky & Sergio L. Schmukler, Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain: The
Effects of Financial Liberalization (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 03/34, 2003), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0334.pdf.
23. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), available at
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf.
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alization and the rise of privatization that is associated with it is often
thought to be a significant driver of economic expansion and higher
long-run growth.24
While many assert a positive correlation between financial liberalization and growth, the empirical literature is decidedly divided. Critics
have found that external liberalization is more prone to producing instability in developing countries and generates financial fragility that can
often have severe recessionary consequences. 25 Further, economic researchers Glick and Hutchinson found a tendency towards banking and
currency crises following financial liberalization.26 Thus, while financial
liberalization promotes growth more than a repressed economy does, it
also increases market uncertainty and the chances of severely damaging
crises.
When a country uses financial liberalization to promote economic
development, it must take measures to limit instability in markets and the
risk of financial crises. In developing nations, premature liberalization
before a strong prudential regulatory structure is in place can lead to destabilized markets and crises.27 Without adequate regulation and supervision, as economic researchers Arestis and Caner have shown, financial
institutions tend to take excessive risks.28
These are lessons that East Asia learned very directly in the Asian
financial crisis a decade prior to the global and Eurozone financial crises.
In East Asia, the Asian financial crisis triggered a rethinking of both the
developmental state model and the then-prevailing model of financial
liberalization. The result was a synthesis focusing on maintaining financial stability and supporting economic growth. Since the Asian financial

24. See Geert Bekaert, Campbell R. Harvey & Christian Lundblad, Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2001) (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, in their quantitative
analysis, found liberalization of the equity market to have a statistically significant influence on percapita GDP growth); see also Abdul Abiad & Ashoka Mody, Financial Reform: What Shakes It?
What Shapes It? (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 03/70, 2003), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0370.pdf (Abiad and Mody established a positive
connection between financial liberalization and a state’s openness to trade).
25. Charles Wyplosz, How Risky Is Financial Liberalization in the Developing Countries
(Centre for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 2724, 2002); Romain Ranciere, Aaron
Tornell & Frank Westermann, Decomposing the Effects of Financial Liberalization: Crises vs.
Growth, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 3331 (2006).
26. Reuven Glick & Michael M. Hutchison, Banking Crisis and Currency Crisis: How Common Are the Twins?, in FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS 35 (Reuven Glick et al. eds.,
2001).
27. Philip Arestis & Murray Glickman, Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia: Dispelling Illusion
the Minskyan Way, 26 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 237 (2002); Ross P. Buckley, A Tale of Two Crises:
The Search for the Enduring Lessons of International Financial Reform, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2001).
28. Arestis and Caner, supra note 15.
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crisis, finance in the region has been treated pragmatically rather than
relying excessively upon market-focused theoretical approaches.29 Arguably, this pragmatic approach to finance largely explains why the major
financial centers in the region (Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo) suffered
so much less from the global financial crisis than their major Western
competitors (London, New York, Frankfurt, Zurich).
East Asia’s approach was a major innovation in financial regulation
and is even more remarkable as it was dramatically contrary to the prevailing wisdom. It is an innovation that regulators and policymakers
from around the world have increasingly looked towards in the wake of
the global and Eurozone financial crises.30 This is arguably East Asia’s
most important financial innovation in the past fifteen years, and it
should be accorded a high profile. Given the significant Asian membership of the G20 and Financial Stability Board, and the region’s relative
success in the area of financial regulation over the past fifteen years,
there are important opportunities for the region to lead global approaches
to financial regulation.
East Asia’s financial systems span a wide range of development
levels, from world-class international financial centers to primitive financial systems. It is thus difficult to address concerns regionally. Nonetheless, looking forward, East Asia should continue to adopt its pragmatic approach to financial innovation, seeking to balance financial stability
and economic growth with market enhancing policies and institutional
reforms.
Identifying financial limitations across the region will help to identify areas in which innovation should be encouraged. We have identified
five areas that should be of central concern for financial stability and
economic growth: trade finance, mortgage markets, SME finance, nonbank finance, and mobile financial services.
IV. TRADE FINANCE
International trade enhances efficiency and competitiveness within
economies and promotes their economic development.31 Trade finance is
essential to support trade, and the region that finances more trade than

29. Andrew Sheng, CEO of the Fung Institute, has repeatedly advocated a pragmatic approach
to finance in Asia. See, e.g., Andrew Sheng, The Regulatory Reform of Global Financial Markets:
An Asian Regulator’s Perspective, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 191 (2010).
30. Michael Schuman, Can Asian-Style Capitalism Save the West?, TIME (Mar. 25, 2012),
http://business.time.com/2012/03/25/can-asian-style-capitalism-save-the-west/.
31. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, AUSTRALIAN GOV., TRADE, DEVELOPMENT AND
POVERTY REDUCTION (2007), available at http://www.ausaid.gov.au/Publications/Documents/
trade_devel_poverty.pdf.
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any other is East Asia.32 Some 80% to 90% of global trade transactions
are supported by some form of credit financing. 33 Finance for international trade transactions is important for leading nations and particularly
critical for developing and emerging markets where both exporters and
importers may be severely constrained by limited working capital.
A. The Global Financial Crisis: Impact on Trade Finance
The global financial crisis sparked a substantial worldwide shortfall
in trade finance in a global market estimated at US$10–$12 trillion a
year.34 The effects of this contraction were markedly different in different regions.35 South Asia, Korea, and China were particularly affected,
with China experiencing a double-digit decline in the availability of trade
finance during 2008.36 The G20 responded with its “trade finance package” in April 2009, which ensured the availability of $250 billion to support trade finance over a two-year period. 37 The package provided a
much-needed boost, and financiers worldwide responded to the package
by making substantially more finance available for trade.
Export credit agencies (ECAs) increased credit insurance and risk
mitigation capacity by creating programs for short-term lending of working capital and credit guarantees aimed primarily at small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs). 38 Within the region, the leaders of eleven
Asian ECAs formed the Asian Regional Cooperation Group (RCG) of
the Berne Union and supported more than $268 billion worth of international trade and investment in 2008. 39 Regional development banks
(RDBs) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) responded by
32. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RETHINKING TRADE & FINANCE 13 (Thierry Senechal ed.,
2013), available at http://www.iccindiaonline.org/new-survey.pdf.
33. Marc Auboin, Restoring Trade Finance During a Period of Financial Crisis: Stock-Taking
of Recent Initiatives 1 (World Trade Org., Working Paper No. ERSD-2009-16, 2009), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200916_e.pdf.
34. Marc Auboin, Boosting the Availability of Trade Finance in the Current Crisis: Background Analysis for a Substantial G20 Package, POL’Y INSIGHT (Centre Econ. Pol’y Res., Eur.),
June 2009, at 1, 3, available at http://www.cepr.org/sites/default/files/policy_insights/PolicyInsight
35.pdf; Marc Auboin & Martina Engemann, Trade Finance in Periods of Crisis: What Have We
Learned in Recent Years? 14 (World Trade Org., Econ. Research & Statistics Div., Staff Working
Paper No. 2013-01, 2013), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201301_e.pdf.
35. See Elizabeth Ho, The International Effects of the Credit Crisis, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 102 (2008).
36. Wei Liu & Yann Duval, Trade Finance in Times of Crisis and Beyond, ALERTS ON
EMERGING POL’Y CHALLENGES (Asia Pac. Research & Training Network on Trade), April 2009, at
1, available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/alert3.pdf.
37 . G20 LEADERS’ STATEMENT AT THE 2009 LONDON SUMMIT ¶ 22 (2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf.
38. Auboin & Engemann, supra note 34, at 17.
39. Id.
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significantly increasing the capacity of trade facilitation programs.40 For
example, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) increased the capacity of
its program from US$400 million to US$1 billion.41 Central banks in nations with substantial foreign exchange reserves responded by making
portions of those reserves available to finance trade.42 Within East Asia,
Korea pledged US$10 billion of its foreign exchange reserve to supply
foreign currency to local banks and importers through repurchase agreements.43 Indonesia acted similarly.44
The G20 package ended in 2011. Trade finance market conditions
improved continuously over the two-year period up to this time, with
falling prices and increasing volumes of transactions, albeit with some
volatility around an upward trend. 45 However, recovery has not been
even across all countries, and gaps in trade finance persist.
B. Europe’s Withdrawal of Trade Finance to Asia
Efforts to address the Asian trade finance gap have been hampered
by the ongoing economic crisis in Europe. European banks that traditionally provided trade finance facilities in East Asia have severely limited
their extensions of credit so as to improve their capital ratios. 46 Since
2008, the proportion of international credit provided by Eurozone and
Swiss banks to emerging Asia–Pacific economies has fallen from 38% to
19% of the region’s trade credit.47 This retreat has led to a dramatic increase in trade finance prices in Asian markets.48 According to Barclays,
“[W]hen European banks started to deleverage due to the Euro crisis [in

40. Id.
41. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD), TRADE FINANCING AND
REGIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FROM A SOUTH–SOUTH PERSPECTIVE (2012) (Switz.) [hereinafter UNCTAD], available at http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciimem2d11_en.pdf;
The Challenges of Trade Financing, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
coher_e/challenges_e.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
42. Auboin & Engemann, supra note 34, at 17.
43. The Challenges of Trade Financing, supra note 41; see also Auboin, supra note 34, at 5–6.
44. The Challenges of Trade Financing, supra note 41.
45. Auboin & Engemann, supra note 34, at 17.
46. Aki Ito & Shamim Adam, European Retreat Squeezes Asia Trade Finance As ADB Sees
Loan Demand Climb, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-05/
credit-squeeze-hits-asia-trade-finance-as-adb-loan-demand-soars.html.
47. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND
FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 17–18 (Claudio Borrio et al. eds., 2012), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1212.pdf.
48. Michael Bainbridge, Basel III Threat to Asian Trade Finance, FIN. NEWS (Oct. 29, 2012),
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-10-29/basel3-threat-to-asian-trade-finance?ea9c8a2de0e
e111045601ab04d673622.
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2011], trade finance pricing in Asian countries including India and China
moved from 100 basis points to 200 basis points in three weeks.”49
The reduction in trade finance by European banks has left a funding
gap at a time of increasing demand for trade finance in Asia.50 In 2011, a
US$1 billion trade contract between the United States and China could
not proceed due to the lack of trade finance.51 In 2012, Chinese exports
grew by 25%, imports climbed by 28.8%,52 and the demand for trade
finance products increased correspondingly.53
Fortunately, Japanese banks and some international banks, such as
HSBC and Standard Chartered, have stepped in to cover much of the
trade finance gap left by the European banks. In the past two years, Japanese banks have dramatically increased their share of large-ticket regional trade finance volumes, growing from 6% in 2010 to an extraordinary
54% in the first quarter of 2012.54 As a result, Japan became the largest
provider of trade finance globally in 2012, with reported trade finance
volumes of US$16.8 billion.55
Despite Japanese and other nations’ banks stepping in, there is still
a trade finance shortfall in East Asia today, which is serious given the
critical role finance plays in facilitating trade. The shortfall particularly
affects the region because a higher proportion of trade is financed in East
Asia than other regions: more than 80% of trade letters of credit are issued in Asia.56
In addition to a simple shortfall of finance, Asian companies have
complained that the cost of trade finance is rising, probably due to the
growing pricing power exerted by the few banks in the region willing to
extend trade credit.57 While the top forty institutions represented 95% of

49. Id. (citing Kay Chye Tan of Barclays).
50. Ito & Adam, supra note 46.
51. UNCTAD, supra note 41.
52. Sarah Turner & V. Phani Kumar, China Data Helps Lift Most Asia Stocks; Japan Down,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2013), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2013-02-08/markets/36970890_1_quart
erly-net-loss-sony-corp-china-data.
53. Summary of WTO Report on G-20 Trade Measures (Mid-May to Mid-October 2012),
WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/igo_31oct
12_e.htm.
54. MORGAN STANLEY, CROSS ASSET RESEARCH: EU BANK DELEVERAGING & ASIAN TRADE
FINANCE (2012), available at http://pg.jrj.com.cn/acc/Res/CN_RES/INVEST/2012/6/1/8fa9fcad09b7-4dc6-a05a-dcb2d692b442.pdf.
55. Japan Tops Trade Finance Charts, GLOBAL TRADE REV. (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.gt
review.com/trade-finance/global-trade-review-news/2013/January/Japan-tops-trade-finance-charts_1
0637.shtml.
56. Bainbridge, supra note 48.
57. Francesco Guerrera, French Banks Say Adieu to Financing Asian Trade, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
3, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443571904577629250952177234.html.
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the Asian trade finance market in 2011, only twenty remained in the
market for Asian trade finance in 2012.58
C. Basel III and Its Impact on Trade Finance
Apart from the retreat of European banks, the largest challenge on
the horizon lies in the implementation of Basel III, the third Accord
agreed upon by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS),
which aims to improve risk management and governance within the
global banking sector. While Basel III aims to establish a level playing
field across borders, the regulation is based on Western experiences, and
its implementation will not have the same impact worldwide. 59 Basel
III’s requirement of larger capital holdings against trade transactions
could slow trade financing in emerging and developing economies in the
Asian region by substantially raising transaction costs and discouraging
trade financing, thereby exacerbating the trade finance shortage in the
region.60
Most experts expected that Basel III would considerably increase
trade finance pricing worldwide if implemented in its original form. 61
After two years of intense pressure from the banking industry, the BCBS
modified the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) for trade finance products in
January 2013 and delayed its full implementation until 2019.62 The decision to relax the LCR has been regarded by the industry as positive;
however, the longer-term impact of Basel III is still likely to increase the
cost of financing trade.63

58. MORGAN STANLEY, supra note 54.
59. Takehiko Nakao, Vice Minister of Fin. for Int’l Affairs, Japan, Address at the Asian Financial Forum in Hong Kong, International Regulatory Reform and New Financial Infrastructure in
Asia (Jan. 14, 2013), available at http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/others/20130
114.htm.
60. Douglas J. Elliot calls it a “dangerous misconception” that raising capital requirements will
ensure a safer banking requirement and believes considerably more debate is needed. See Douglas J.
Elliot, Higher Bank Capital Requirements Would Come at a Price, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 20,
2013),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/02/20-bank-capital-requirements-elliott;
Shawn Baldwin, Basel Barriers: How Capital Requirements Would Impede Progress in the Sovereign Debt Crisis, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/shawnbaldwin/2012/10/15/b
asel-barriers.
61. See Bainbridge, supra note 48; Viren Vaghela, Basel III Threatens to Throttle Trade Finance, ASIA RISK (July 9, 2012), http://www.risk.net/asia-risk/feature/2190078/basel-iii-threatensthrottle-trade-finance.
62. David Enrich, Geoffrey T. Smith & Andrew Morse, Rules For Lenders Relaxed, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323482504578226281251185
090.html.
63. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GLOBAL RISKS TRADE FINANCE REPORT 59 (Thierry
Senechal ed., 2013), available at http://www.icctraderegister.com/docs/public/ICC%20Global%20
Risks%202013%20Report%20Final%20Version.pdf.
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D. Potential Responses
While the governments and regional institutions in East Asia have
largely succeeded in coming together to ensure availability of trade finance, there are still significant steps that can be taken to enhance the
provision of this critical type of finance for the region. These include
further adjustments to the Basel III rules; deepening cross-border cooperation; creating a ring-fenced liquidity pool for trade finance; encouraging public–private partnerships and co-financing; as well as establishing
a regional trade finance database.
1. Further Adjustments to the Basel III Rules
Trade finance rates of default and loss have historically been very
low, even during crises.64 In 2009, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and ADB initiated a trade finance default register to collect
performance data on trade finance products.65 The project’s data supports
the claim that trade finance is much less risky than other types of credit.66
Between 2008 and 2010, the ICC Trade Finance Register observed fewer
than 3,000 defaults in a full dataset of 11.4 million transactions.67 The
data collected determined the probability of loss as just 0.02% in a period
of global economic turmoil.68
The proposed Basel III rules do not come close to reflecting this
very low level of risk involved in trade finance. At present, there is no
differentiation between trade finance and other forms of financing in
credit conversion factors (CCFs) for calculating the leverage ratio.69 The
current rules require banks to apply a CCF of 100% for all off-balance
sheet items when calculating a leverage ratio.70 Under the first two Basel
Accords, trade credit attracted a low risk weighting of 20% because of its
low default rates and because trade finance facilities are typically secured

64. Id. at 15.
65. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GLOBAL RISKS—TRADE FINANCE 16 (Thierry Senechal
ed., 2011), available at http://www.icctraderegister.com/docs/public/ICC-Register_Report_26_Octo
ber_2011%20-%20Public%20Report.pdf.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Vaghela, supra note 61.
69. Garima Chitkara & Aaron Woolner, Revised LCR Falls Short on Ending Basel III Concerns Over Trade Finance, ASIA RISK (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.risk.net/asia-risk/news/2242693/
revised-lcr-falls-short-on-ending-basel-iii-concerns-over-trade-finance.
70. Laurence Neville, Euromoney Trade Finance Survey 2012: Trade Not Getting the Credit,
EUROMONEY (Jan. 2012), http://www.euromoney.com/Article/2959489/Euromoney-Trade-Financesurvey-2012-Trade-not-getting-the-credit.html?Type=Article&ArticleID=2959489.
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against the goods or commodities being financed.71 The Basel Committee’s introduction of a flat 100% CCF to certain off-balance sheet items
in 2010 was an attempt to reduce incentives for “leveraging.”72 This included letters of credit and similar trade finance facilities.73 Subjecting
trade finance to a CCF of 100% is excessive given that the objective of
the leverage ratio is to prevent the build-up of excessive leverage in the
banking sector; yet, as trade finance is underpinned by the movement of
goods and services, it does not lead to the sort of leveraging that may
endanger real economic activity.74 Rather, it leads to leveraging that actually supports the real economy.
The leverage ratio in its current form does not reflect market realities and will significantly limit the ability of banks to provide affordable
financing to businesses in developing countries and SMEs in developed
countries. 75 In its report, Global Risks—Trade Finance 2011, the ICC
identified numerous ways the leverage ratio proposed by Basel III could
adversely affect global trade and growth.76 Examples include encouraging the use of high-risk financial products, increasing the cost of trade,
and limiting banks’ ability to provide affordable financing to businesses
in developing countries.77
At present, Basel III also uses a standard asset value correlation
(AVC) for corporate banking, imposing a treatment for trade finance that
does not reflect its short-term, low-risk nature.78 The current rule requires
the AVC to be multiplied by 1.25 in respect to exposures to financial
institutions whose assets exceed US$100 billion and to exposures to all
unregulated financial institutions, regardless of size. 79 The increase in
AVC applies to all sources of credit risk exposure.80 The rule is based on
71. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, TREATMENT OF
TRADE FINANCE UNDER THE BASEL CAPITAL FRAMEWORK (2011) (Switz.), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs205.pdf.
72. Neville, supra note 70.
73. Id.
74. BANKERS’ ASS’N FOR FIN. & TRADE AND INT’L FIN. SERV. ASS’N (BAFT–IFSA), TRADE
FINANCE—KEY CONCERNS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BASEL FRAMEWORK (2011), available at http://www.esf.be/new/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/BAFT-IFSA-Basel-Talking-Points-201112-01-Final.pdf.
75. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 65, at 4.
76. Id. at 7–8.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also BAFT–IFSA, supra note 74.
79. Citi: Sailing the Trade Winds of Change, TRADE FIN. (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://www.tradefinancemagazine.com/Article/3102583/Citi-Sailing-the-trade-winds-of-change.html;
AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., IMPLEMENTING BASEL III CAPITAL REFORMS IN
AUSTRALIA—COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK AND OTHER MEASURES (2012) [hereinafter APRA],
available at http://www.apra.gov.au/adi/PrudentialFramework/Documents/APRA_Discussionpaper_
BASEL3_CCR_FINAL_2.pdf.
80. APRA, supra note 79.

322

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:307

the assumption that such exposures present greater systemic risks or default correlations than others. 81 This assumption ignores the fact that
trade finance rates of default are dramatically lower than the rates of default in other banking sectors.
While Basel III subjects corporate banking to a blanket AVC, consumer banking is granted several product specific default curves.82 Under
Basel III, separate AVCs are applied to retail mortgages, credit cards,
and other retail exposures.83 Corporate banking products should likewise
be distinguished from one another to accurately reflect their level of risk.
Applying a standard AVC is likely to increase the cost of providing trade
finance and may prompt smaller banks to pursue other more profitable
areas of banking.84 This could particularly affect emerging markets.
Recent changes to the LCR under Basel III came about after sustained pressure from the trade finance industry.85 At present, making further changes to the rules may be difficult for the Basel Committee given
public sentiment towards banks.86 Furthermore, the Basel Committee is
faced with the challenge that concessions for one type of financing may
encourage others to make such claims.87 Nevertheless, statistical information demonstrates that trade finance is far less risky than other forms
of finance and provides a strong case for the industry to continue lobbying the Basel Committee to modify the Basel III rules.88 Without changes
to the leverage ratio and AVC, it is highly likely that the price of trade
finance will increase, with damaging consequences for trade and growth
globally, particularly in East Asia.
2. Deepening Cross-Border Cooperation
Deepening regional cooperation on trade finance would be beneficial to all parties.89 By pooling resources and expertise, East Asia would
be better equipped to tackle bottlenecks in trade financing.90 The cost of
providing trade finance would also likely decrease.91 Cooperation within
the region would reduce reliance on foreign finance, which tends to be

81. Chitkara & Woolner, supra note 69.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Citi: Sailing the Trade Winds of Change, supra note 79.
85. Enrich, Smith & Morse, supra note 62.
86. Neville, supra note 70.
87. Chitkara & Woolner, supra note 69.
88. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 65.
89. Liu & Duval, supra note 36, at 3.
90. Id.
91. UNCTAD, supra note 41.
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heavily pro-cyclical and often destabilizing,92 as is seen in the current
trade finance gap caused by the retreat of European banks from Asia.
In March 2012, the Export–Import banks of the BRICS (Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa) agreed to extend credit facilities
to each other in local currencies.93 It is expected this move will reduce
the demand for fully convertible currencies for transactions among the
BRICS, which should help to reduce transaction costs. 94 The initiative
will also assist to shield the BRICS from the Eurozone crisis and boost
trade despite the slow growth of developed country markets.95
As the Eurozone crisis continues, it is likely that European banks
will continue to withdraw credit from the region. Strengthening the regional network of export–import banks and development finance institutions within Asia, and entering into agreements similar to those of the
BRICS to extend credit to each other in local currencies, would greatly
assist the region. Deepening cross-border cooperation within Asia will
reduce the cost of trade finance within the region, tackle current trade
finance bottlenecks, and help to insulate Asian economies from the crisis
in Europe.
Despite the benefits that could be derived from regional cooperation, previous initiatives to improve financial cooperation within Asia
have not always succeeded. In 2010, Australia’s idea of establishing a
trade finance network within Asia was not supported by other members
of the East Asia Summit.96 Nonetheless, the creation of a trade finance
network within Asia is something that regional countries should continue
to pursue. Its potential benefits to the region, given the on-going demand
for trade credit in the region, would be substantial indeed.
3. Creating a Ring-Fenced Liquidity Pool for Trade Finance
Since the global financial crisis, banks have become more risk
averse and prefer to work with large, sound multinational firms.97 SMEs
and new exporters have been especially vulnerable to the tightening trade
finance conditions, as they typically have a weaker capital base and bar-

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Eko NM Saputro, The East Asia Summit and Regional Financial Cooperation, E. ASIA F.
(Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/18/the-east-asia-summit-and-regionalfinancial-cooperation/.
97. Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Mariem Malouche, Trade Finance During the 2008–9 Trade
Collapse: Key Takeaways, ECON. PREMISE (World Bank, Washington D.C.), Sept. 2011, at 1, 5,
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPREMNET/Resources/EP66.pdf.
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gaining power in relation to global buyers and banks.98 Firms in developing countries with underdeveloped financial systems and weak contractual enforcement systems are particularly affected by a lack of affordable
trade finance as they need it the most.99
Establishing a small, targeted liquidity pool run by international financial institutions would be useful to assist smaller segments of the
market that are more vulnerable to the contraction of trade credit.100 After
the global financial crisis, much of the increased liquidity support provided by central banks was used to ease money market conditions and
improve liquidity ratios.101 As a result, trade transactions did not benefit
greatly from the liquidity support.102 Creating a ring-fenced liquidity pool
for trade finance would ensure that adequate funds remain available to
assist trade by SMEs and new exporters, even during times of crisis
when banks may prefer to direct funds elsewhere.
For banks, the downside to ring-fencing is that liquidity is prevented from being used for other purposes at times when the other purposes
might be more pressing. 103 Large cross-border banking groups benefit
from the efficiency of holding liquidity centrally and directing it to locations where it is most needed.104 This process is more cost-effective than
ring-fencing liquidity.105 Nonetheless, any disadvantages of a ring-fenced
liquidity pool for trade finance would be far outweighed by the benefit of
ensuring that trade finance is still available for SMEs and new exporters
when economic crises occur and trade finance conditions tighten. The
global financial architecture needs to reflect that the finance of trade is
probably the most important form of finance for the real economy.
4. Encouraging Co-Finance Between the Various Providers of Trade
Finance, Including Public Sector-Backed Institutions
The private sector provides the majority of trade finance. In 2009,
private banks accounted for about 80% of all trade finance.106 Such reliance on banks leaves trading firms vulnerable in times of crisis, as we
have seen with the recent drop in trade credit provided to Asia by Euro-

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Auboin, supra note 34, at 5.
101. Auboin & Engemann, supra note 34, at 19.
102. Id.
103. Viren Vaghela, Asian Regulators Get Tough on Liquidity Ring-Fencing, ASIA RISK (Apr.
1, 2011), http://www.risk.net/asia-risk/feature/2041993/asian-regulators-tough-liquidity-ring-fencing.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Pascal Lamy, Trade Finance: Rebooting the Engine, INT’L TRADE F. MAG. (Jan. 1, 2009),
http://www.tradeforum.org/Trade-Finance-Rebooting-the-Engine.
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pean banks. 107 To reduce the impact of crises on trade finance flows,
public sector actors, such as ECAs and RDBs, should share some of the
private sector risk.108 An example of a successful public–private partnership was the introduction of the Global Trade Liquidity Program by the
IFC in 2009, which allowed for a 40%–60% co-lending agreement between the IFC and commercial banks.109 The program allowed banks to
continue to support clients with trade finance and gave the IFC the ability
to channel liquidity and credit into markets to help revitalise trade flows
by leveraging the banks’ networks across emerging markets globally.110
Mobilizing private and public sector institutions to form a partnership during times of crisis would ensure that institutions with excess capacities have an opportunity to meet the needs of those with insufficient
funds.111 However, co-financing between the two sectors need not only
be limited in times of crisis. Longer-term cooperation would help to
close the structural market gaps in the region and reduce the impact of
any future financial crises on the availability of trade finance.112
5. Establishing a Regional Trade Finance Database to Facilitate the
Collection and Exchange of Information
Filling information gaps between public and private institutions is
of great importance, particularly during times of economic crisis. While
responding to the financial crisis that commenced in 2008, members of
the Bankers’ Association for Finance and Trade complained that a series
of measures announced by ECAs and RDBs were hard to track.113 They
also lacked access to critical information, such as who was providing
what finance and under what criteria.114 These types of information gaps
affect the ability of both the public and private sectors to respond to trade
finance challenges, particularly in developing countries.115 It is thus crucial that information is collected and shared among trade finance stakeholders within the region.
The ICC Trade Register, established by the ICC and ADB in 2009,
was a significant step towards increasing access to trade finance infor-

107. Guerrera, supra note 57.
108. Auboin, supra note 34, at 5.
109. Auboin & Engemann, supra note 34, at 18.
110. Global Trade Liquidity Program, INT’L FIN. CORP., http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/con
nect/Industry_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/Industries/Financial+Markets/Trade+and
+Supply+Chain/GTLP/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
111. Auboin & Engemann, supra note 34, at 14.
112. Id. at 3.
113. Lamy, supra note 106, at 5.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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mation. So far, the database has recorded over fifteen million transactions worldwide, reflecting 70% of global transactions.116 It is currently
the most comprehensive data available on trade and export finance. 117
Nevertheless, the register only records data provided from participating
banks. 118 While this includes twenty-one of the most active banks in
worldwide trade finance,119 gaps in data remain. Within the region, much
more information is needed about how SMEs, in particular, finance their
trade and the challenges they face.
While the information provided by the ICC Trade Register is crucial for the development of trade finance policy, the Register does not
provide stakeholders with up-to-date information about the type and
amount of trade finance being provided at the present time. In times of
crisis, such information is needed to allow trade finance institutions to
respond rapidly.
In order to address gaps in trade finance information, a regional database should be created that disseminates relevant information to both
public and private institutions, such as the development of programs by
ECAs. This type of database should include all trade finance stakeholders within the Asian region and not just commercial banks. It is important that the information gap between the public and private sectors is
filled so that both sectors can respond quickly when shortfalls in trade
finance arise.
V. MORTGAGE MARKETS
Strong housing markets are often equated with strong economic
growth and development. Given the growing population and trend toward urbanization in East Asia, a strong mortgage market is a critical
underpinning for local housing markets. Mortgage market development
varies greatly across the Asian region. Figure 9 shows the extent of
mortgage market development in selected Asian economies in 2006 (before the crisis). 120 At this point in time, Hong Kong’s mortgage mar116. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ICC TRADE REGISTER (2012), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Services/Trade_Facilitation/ICC%20Trade%20Register%20B
rochure.pdf.
117. Id.
118. The ICC Trade Register, INT’L CHAMBER COM., http://www.icctraderegister.com/ (last
visited Sept. 30, 2013).
119. Id.
120. We show pre-crisis levels on the supposition that markets will recover toward their longterm equilibrium levels of mortgage finance after adjusting to the temporary impact of the global
financial crisis. See Loïc Chiquier, Housing Finance in East Asia (World Bank, Working Paper No.
39393, 2006) (Fr.), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer
/WDSP/IB/2007/04/13/000090341_20070413101713/Rendered/PDF/393930EAP0Housing1Finance
01PUBLIC1.pdf.
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kets—unsurprisingly in light of recent events—had already developed
the most, standing at about 50% of GDP and 25% of overall lending. At
the other end of the spectrum, mortgage markets in Indonesia represented
only about 3% of GDP.

In virtually every developed economy, mortgage financing supports
housing markets. However, its effect varies in different domestic financial sectors. China’s mortgage finance market, for example, eclipses
mortgage markets in the rest of Asia.121 Yet, the Chinese mortgage market remains but a fraction of the size of the U.S. market.122 China’s housing loans-to-GDP ratio stands at about 16%, while U.S. ratios peaked at
about 80%. 123 Government supply of housing and purchasing using
pooled family resources explain China’s housing loans-to-GDP ratio.124
In most developed economies, strong housing markets underpin and
correlate with robust economic growth.125 A strong housing market also
creates jobs.126 In Hong Kong, rapid housing sector development has not

121. Mortgage Market in Asia, ECON. WATCH (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.economywatch.co
m/mortgage/asia.html.
122. Id.
123. Hans Wagner, Will China Housing Market Follow the U.S. in a Mortgage Bust?, MARKET
ORACLE (June 17, 2010), http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article20386.html.
124. Id.
125. Leah Schnurr, Housing Market Rebound Fails to Recharge Economy, NBC NEWS (Nov. 5,
2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/economywatch/housing-market-rebound-fails-recharge-ec
onomy-1C6859650; Jonathan Spicer & Leah Schnurr, Housing Still Impediment to U.S Growth: Fed
Officials, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/05/us-usa-fed-idUSBRE8
9419L20121005.
126. Spicer & Schnurr, supra note 125.
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correlated with vigorous growth in gross metropolitan product (GMP).127
In Singapore, on the other hand, highly developed banking and equity
markets, along with associated legal and regulatory infrastructures, have
helped support sustained growth in housing finance markets. 128 Nevertheless, Singapore’s active mortgage market makes the city-state more
vulnerable to an overheated and overpriced market. Japan possesses
Asia’s second-largest mortgage market and the most sophisticated mortgage financing market.129 With mortgage-to-GDP ratios of approximately
40%, the reliance of Japan’s financial markets on mortgage-generated
returns cannot be underestimated. 130 This dependence on mortgagebacked finance has led the Japanese economy to heights and depths that
are all too familiar.
In developing economies, the relationship between mortgage finance and economic growth is murkier. Housing prices in China continue to rise at an alarming rate, in spite of the relatively small size of the
residential finance market. 131 The Chinese government and many investment analysts fear that the Chinese housing market may resemble
that of Japan in the 1970s.132 However, Koyo Ozeki points out that while
Japan’s economy had matured by the 1980s, China’s economy still possesses enormous upside growth potential.133 China’s young demographic
profile will continue to drive the demand for new housing for the foreseeable future.134
In Southeast Asia, the link between mortgage markets and economic growth also remains relatively unclear. In India, the mortgage finance
market represents about 8% of GDP at US$104 billion.135 India’s mortgage industry remains at a nascent stage, and mortgage markets should
grow by 15% annually to achieve a mortgage-to-GDP level of 13% with-

127. Haibin Zhu, The Structure of Housing Finance Markets and House Prices in Asia, 2006
BIS Q. REV. 55, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0612g.pdf.
128. Id.
129. Mortgage Market in Asia, supra note 121.
130. Id.
131. Xiaoyi Shao & Natalie Thomas, China Home Prices Rise Further in August, Testing
Government, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/18/us-china-propert
y-prices-idUSBRE98H02120130918.
132. Andrew Batson, China Seeks to Tame Boom, Stirs Growth Fears, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703405704575014703152997616.html.
133. Koyo Ozeki, The Chinese Real Estate Market: A Comparison with Japan’s Bubble, ASIAN
PERSP. (PIMCO, Newport Beach, Cal.), Dec. 2009, available at http://media.pimco-gloal.com/pdfs/
pdf/PIMCO%20Asian%20Perspectives%20by%20Koyo%20Ozeki%20Dec%202009_US.pdf.
134. Id.
135. Pooja Thakur & Anto Antony, India 15% Loan Growth Led by Cautious Buyers: Mortgages, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-08/india-15-loangrowth-led-by-cautious-buyers-mortgages.html.
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in the next five years.136 The migration of professionals to major cities
such as Mumbai and Bangalore continues to support such growth. In a
population averse to debt, the average mortgage loan repayment duration
stands at about thirteen years.137 In Thailand, the housing market is supported by a strong land registry system that has been in place for more
than a century. The registration system has evolved to being able to facilitate land title transfers extremely quickly and efficiently (often in less
than a day) and can easily be navigated without the need of a lawyer or a
real estate agent.138 The home financing market is very competitive, and
there has been a recent lowering of interest rates to help stimulate home
ownership for first time buyers.139
Mortgage markets in developing parts of Southeast Asia remain
very small. In Indonesia, few homebuyers take out mortgages, as purchasers traditionally pay cash for their residences. 140 Housing markets
appear to have flourished nevertheless, although lack of credit finance
has tended to keep home prices low. In Vietnam and Cambodia, mortgage markets do not yet play a significant role in supporting the housing
markets. 141 That is expected to change, particularly in Vietnam as its
economy continues to evolve.142
Urban migration has supported the need for and development of
housing markets across Asia. By 2030, 50%–55% of Asian people are
expected to reside in urban regions.143 Urbanization will continue to underpin the importance of the housing market and housing finance for
low- and middle-income families. As such, stable housing markets and
mortgage markets that finance home purchases remain vitally important.

136. Id.
137. EMKAY GLOBAL FIN. SERVS. LTD., INDIA—HOUSING FINANCE: UNDETERRED BY ROUGH
SEAS (2012), available at http://emkayglobal.com/downloads/researchreports/India%20-%20Housin
g%20Finance_Sector%20Report.pdf.
138. Khan Prachuabmoh, President of Gov’t Hous. Bank, Thailand, Address at The Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania, Thailand’s Home Mortgage Market (June 18, 2010), available
at http://ihfp.wharton.upenn.edu/25th%20Anniversary%20Presentations%5CKhan.pdf.
139. Mortgage Market to Be Heated, AFTA SOURCES (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.afta source
s.com/news/show-1635.html.
140. See Sonia Kolesnikov-Jessop, Bali’s Cash Property Market Keeps Prices Up, N.Y. TIMES
( Feb. 9 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/29/realestate/29iht-rebali.1.19777791.html?_r=0.
141. RON FLORANCE, WELLS FARGO, FRONTIER MARKETS: VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA (2012),
available at https://www.wealthmanagementinsights.com/UserDocs/Frontier_Markets_Report_Vietn
am_and_Cambodia_FINAL_7.13.12_Client_approved_ADA.pdf.
142. Id.
143. U.N. Population Div., Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects: The
2001 Revision (2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2001/wup
2001dh.pdf.
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A. The Mixed Reform of Housing-Related Lending in Asia
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) Guidelines on mortgage underwriting serve as a useful starting point in deciding whether various
Asian countries have the regulatory institutions in place to provide for
pro-development outcomes and manage the risks to the financial sector
concomitant with mortgage finance.144 These principles include effective
verification of income and other financial information, reasonable debt
service coverage, appropriate loan-to-value ratios, effective collateral
management, prudent use of mortgage insurance, and effective supervisory powers and tools.
Differences in regulations designed to maintain appropriate loan-tovalue ratios represent an important illustration of the way that financial
regulation can balance development needs and financial risks. Korea represents a positive example. The Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) targeted loan-to-value requirements for certain zoning areas in particular
and applied different maximum levels to various zones.145 Korean regulators then changed these requirements counter-cyclically in response to
changes in the economy.146 Korea’s financial regulators coordinated with
other government departments to ensure that loan-to-value requirements
served the broader interests of regional development and other policy
objectives. As a result of such targeted policies, housing price-to-income
ratios rose by only 7% in Korea between 2000 and 2007.147 In contrast,
these ratios rose more than 30% in a range of OECD countries.148 Such
an example shows how dynamic mortgage regulations can strike a balance between development and risk-management needs better than a
fixed policy rule.
The Hong Kong case shows how regulators may need to constantly
adjust their mortgage underwriting rules. In Hong Kong, housing prices

144. FIN. STABILITY BD., FSB PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE
UNDERWRITING PRACTICES (2012), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_120418.pdf.
145. OH Hwa Se, Loan-to-Value As Macro-Prudential Policy Tool: Experiences and Lessons
of Asian Emerging Countries (Duisenberg Sch. of Fin., Policy Paper Series, Paper No. 33, 2013),
available at http://www.dsf.nl/assets/cms/File/Research/DSF%20Policy%20Paper%20No%2033%
20Loan-to-Value%20as%20Macro-Prudential%20Policy%20Tool.pdf.
146. Soon-taek Chang, Mortgage Lending in Korea: An Example of a Countercyclical Macroprudential Approach (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5505, 2010), available at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5505.
147. Se, supra note 145, at 7.
148. Id. at 7. For more on the response of Korean real estate prices to changes in loan-to-value
and other requirements, see Deniz Igan & Heedon Kang, Do Loan-to-Value and Debt-to-Income
Limits Work? Evidence from Korea (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/297, 2011).
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have risen 73% over the last three years,149 yet the city’s GDP grew only
1.8% in 2012.150 This has caused the authorities to question the sustainability of current high property prices. In response, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) instituted its fifth round of property market
measures—including tightening the maximum debt servicing limit and
capping home loan amounts in an effort to cool the overpriced residential
property market.151 Economists expect these measures to cut Hong Kong
mortgage lending by 25% to HK$171.3 billion (US$22.1 billion), which
would return the market to levels approaching those in 2007.152 Nonetheless, the market remains overpriced.153
Indian policymaking shows the opposite extreme: how slowmoving and contradictory regulation can limit development and increase
systemic risk.154 Urban housing has failed to keep up with rapidly expanding demand for residential housing due to failures in land and housing laws and mortgage finance laws.155 Inappropriate formal institutions
governing the supply of land and real estate have resulted in high transactions costs, fragmented markets, tenuous approval processes for building, and low mortgage rates.156
Prudential regulation in India has adjusted slowly to the rapidly
evolving demand for housing. First, changes to formal institutions have
allowed for broader changes in the risks and returns to mortgage finance. 157 Easier recovery reduced risks for financial institutions and
transferred some of those risks to borrowers. Instead of the previous
quantitative restrictions placed on lending, Indian mortgage finance institutions allowed lenders and borrowers to take greater risks but price
those risks themselves.158 Second, changes in formal institutions have led
149. RATING & VALUATION DEP’T, HONG KONG PROPERTY REVIEW MONTHLY SUPPLEMENT
(2013) (China), available at http://www.rvd.gov.hk/doc/en/statistics/full.pdf.
150. INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: COPING WITH HIGH DEBT AND
SLUGGISH GROWTH (2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/pdf/
text.pdf.
151. Oswald Chen, Mortgage Lending Value May Fall, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2012-09/19/content_15766724.htm.
152. Id.
153. Chester Yung, IMF: Hong Kong Property Sector Poses Severe Risk, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324024004578174441917470354.html.
154. JOHN Y. CAMPBELL, TARUN RAMADORAI & VIMAL BALASUBRAMANIAM, PRUDENTIAL
REGULATION OF HOUSING FINANCE IN INDIA: 1995–2011 (2012), available at http://scholar.harvar
d.edu/files/campbell/files/regulators_regulationappendix_09082012.pdf.
155. KPMG, BRIDGING THE URBAN HOUSING SHORTAGE IN INDIA (2012) (India), available at
http://www.kpmg.com/IN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Urban-housingshortage-in-India.pdf.
156. U.N. Human Settlements Programme, Housing Finance Mechanisms in India 8–10 (2008)
(India), available at http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx? publicationID=2507.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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to changes in informal institutions. The “rules of the game” of mortgage
lending have clearly changed, as informal norms have encouraged a large
increase in mortgage lending. Mortgage lending as a percentage of GDP
has increased four-fold from 2008 to 2012.159 Third, Indian institutions—
despite their adaptation—have remained “sticky.” In contrast to India’s
waves of mortgage-related reform, regulators in jurisdictions like Hong
Kong and Singapore reform their regulations often, responding to housing market needs and macroeconomic developments. 160 Such Indian
stickiness—or, in academic terms, institutional rigidity—has kept mortgage finance at too low a level to supply enough housing to meet existing
needs.
B. Financial Crises and Mortgage Financing
Given the role of asset securitization in the U.S. subprime crisis, a
key area for housing finance reforms has been to ensure the retention of a
degree of originator interest in securitized loans. Securitization enabled
loan originators to quickly move loans from their balance sheets.161 This
created the moral hazard of originators having no stake in the quality of
the loans being written.162 Mandating the retention of a permanent stake
in a portion of the credit risk is likely to improve the quality of loans
originated.163
An important way forward for East Asia is the enhancement of institutional and legal frameworks that will support the development of a
robust mortgage finance market. 164 These institutional frameworks in-

159. In 2008, UN-Habitat bemoaned low mortgage lending-to-GDP ratios of percent. By 2012,
Thakur and Anto had observed this ratio increase to about 8%. Thakur & Antony, supra note 135.
160. See, e.g., Sharon Chen, Singapore Tightens Rules for Home Loans in Latest Curbs,
BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-28/singapore-tightens-rule
s-for-home-loans-in-latest-curbs.html (discussing recent measures introduced in Singapore).
161. Sara Malekan & Georges Dionne, Securitization and Optimal Retention Under Moral
Hazard (HEC Montreal, Working Paper No. 2038831, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038831.
162. Jack Selody & Elizabeth Woodman, Reform of Securitization, in FINANCIAL SYSTEM
REVIEW 47 (2009) (Can.), available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/
fsr_ 1209.pdf.
163. Section 941 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010)
requires securitizers to retain a minimum 5% interest in mortgages they securitize to better align
their incentives. Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Securitization and Moral Hazard: Evidence Credit
Score Cutoff Rules (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 11-6, 2011),
available at http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/ppdp/2011/ppdp1106.pdf; see also Selody &
Woodman, supra note 162, at 50.
164. Douglas W. Arner et al., Property Rights, Collateral, Creditors Rights, and Insolvency in
East Asia, 42 TEX. INT’L L. J. 515 (2007).
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clude property rights, effective enforcement mechanisms, and regulatory
regimes.165
C. Moving Forward
Policymakers in many Asian countries have adopted policies that
encourage mortgage finance of residential housing and other real estate.
This credit creation deepens domestic financial markets and encourages
access to residential housing. It also has multiplier effects in the construction, consumer goods, and other industries. The potential of these
reforms to underpin further economic growth is large in many of Asia’s
middle-income economies. However, as the United States and European
Union experiences show, linkages between mortgage finance and derivative assets, like mortgage-based securities, can create substantial systemic risk.
Most countries are pursuing mortgage finance reform as part of a
larger effort to strengthen their financial markets. 166 In developing regions of Asia, market reforms have mostly been orientated towards
strengthening core areas, meeting international standards, and increasing
prudential regulatory capacity, with less focus on reforming domestic
mortgage finance markets. With housing clearly being a primary factor
in domestic economic development, greater efforts must be undertaken
regionally to initiate reforms that protect lenders and borrowers and facilitate flows to finance transactions. Regulatory reform efforts in the housing finance sector must strike a balance between advancing homeownership, which supports the domestic economy, and preventing an inflated
real estate bubble, which harms consumers and remains a real risk in a
number of Asian countries.
Asian countries would do well to concentrate on following the advice in the FSB Guidelines. At one extreme, the overzealous establishment of income ceilings and checks on that income can restrict the flow
of funds into residential housing. At the other extreme, lax regulations
can encourage banks to over lend to classes of borrowers who cannot
repay. East Asian nations are generally seeking to strengthen their legal,
institutional, and policy foundations, and this endeavor may well be the
most useful contribution that can be made to mortgage finance reform.
Perhaps the primary focus to promote mortgage markets in the region

165. Johan Torstensson, Property Rights and Economic Growth: An Empirical Study, 47
KYKLOS: INT’L REV. FOR SOC. SCI. 231 (1994).
166. For example, the United States. See Jeff Mason, Obama Touts Mortgage Finance Plan,
Highlights Private Sector Role, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/
06/us-obama-housing-idUSBRE97516Q20130806.
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should be upon the strength of their foundations, much as it is when one
is building a home.
VI. SME FINANCE
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are key drivers of economic growth. Access to capital, however, poses challenges for SMEs.
SMEs often need capital to get off the ground and achieve scale, and
thereby support the economy. Thus, it is important that governments and
financial institutions find ways to increase access to financial capital for
SMEs.
Most of the region’s financial systems are characterized by a small
number of large domestic banks.167 These banks are often quite effective
at funding governments and large corporations.168 However, they tend to
be less effective in funding other forms of economic activity. At the
same time, while equity markets across the region are likewise at varying
levels of development, as a general matter, equity markets are effective
across the more developed economies in the region in supporting large
enterprises.169 Finally, while bond markets were underdeveloped at the
time of the Asian financial crisis, now bond markets are generally functional across the more developed economies in the region.170 Bond markets likewise, though, tend to be most effective in funding government
and large enterprises.171 Thus, there is a particular need in the region to
focus on innovation in supporting the provision of finance other than to
governments and large firms, and particularly to SMEs.
A. The Challenge of SME Finance
In many ways, SME finance is one of the more significant aspects
of financial development for supporting the real economy and growth.172
It has also been among the more difficult to achieve. The important role
167. See Rolf H. Weber & Douglas W. Arner, Toward a New Design for International Financial Regulation, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 391 (2007).
168. Id.
169. Catriona Purfield et al., Asian Equity Markets: Growth, Opportunities, and Challenges
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 06/266, 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06266.pdf.
170. Philip Turner, Weathering Financial Crisis: Domestic Bond Markets in the EMEs, in
WEATHERING FINANCIAL CRISES: BOND MARKETS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 15 (2012), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap63.pdf.
171. INT’L CAPITAL MKT. ASS’N, ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE CORPORATE BOND
MARKETS 13 (2013), available at http://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Media/Brochures/20
13/Corporate-Bond-Markets-March-2013.pdf.
172. EDINBURGH GRP., GROWING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY THROUGH SMES (2012), available
at http://www.edinburgh-group.org/media/2776/edinburgh_group_research_-_growing_the_global_
economy_through_smes.pdf.
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SMEs play at the domestic and international levels is well documented.173 At the same time, SMEs face a variety of financial challenges in
Asian economies.174 While factors such as inflation and exchange rate
fluctuations affect SMEs to a far greater extent than their larger corporate
counterparts, the largest single challenge for an SME in a developing
economy is securing a bank as a funding source. In 2008, the World
Bank released a report that showed few SMEs had a formal bank loan
(only about 20% in China, 30% in Russia, and 55% in India).175 The
number of SMEs within those countries that had not applied for loans at
all was very high. For instance, of SMEs without a bank loan in China,
85% had never applied for one. 176 Likewise, in India, 96% of SMEs
without a loan had never sought one.177 Accessing finance is disproportionately more difficult for SMEs in developing countries. The IFC
found in 2011 that some 41% of SMEs in least developed countries
(LDCs) cited a lack of finance as a major constraint on their growth and
development, compared with 30% in middle-income countries, and 15%
in the most advanced high-income countries.178
The early stages of SME growth and evolution are particularly critical. Businesses are the most financially vulnerable during their launch
and early growth stages. During the early stages of development, SMEs
do not typically have formal funding options and instead rely heavily on
self-funded, internal sources.179 This most often includes savings of principals or, less commonly, funding through the sale or pledging of privately owned assets, a concept that is rare in developing economies.
When self-funding has been exhausted, the availability of external
sources of funding often becomes the factor limiting a firm’s growth and
productivity.180
The lack of SME financing may stem from a number of factors,
such as a lack of legislation supporting credit and allowing security in173. Id.
174. MIRJAM SCHIFFER & BEATRICE WEDER, INT’L FIN. CORP., FIRM SIZE AND THE BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENT: WORLDWIDE SURVEY RESULTS 15 (2001), available at http://wwwwds.world
bank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/12/01/000094946_01111704003345/
Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
175 . WORLD BANK, FINANCE FOR ALL?: POLICIES AND PITFALLS IN EXPANDING ACCESS
(2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFINFORALL/Resources/4099583-11943
73512632/FFA_book.pdf.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. INT’L FIN. CORP., SME FINANCE POLICY GUIDE (2011), available at http://www.gpfi.org/
sites/default/files/documents/SME%20Finance%20Policy%20Guide.pdf.
179. Id.
180. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Ross Levine, SMEs, Growth and Poverty (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11224, 2005), available at: http://www.nber.org/
papers/w11224.pdf?new_window=1.
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terests to be created in the types of collateral that SMEs typically have.
Underdeveloped or unenforceable property rights or weak banking and
institutional structures may also further inhibit funding options.
SMEs in developing and emerging economies face biases within
the formal banking sector, where banks prefer to limit their exposure to
risk by lending to large corporations and governments rather than to
small business entities, effectively squeezing SMEs out of the loan market.181 When SMEs are able to secure formal funding through a bank,
they are often subjected to inordinately high interest rates or overly burdensome terms.182 Nevertheless, a recent report by the IFC and McKinsey found that traditional banks are still the most important source of
formal external financing for SMEs.183 This, in large part, is because capital market access is very difficult for SMEs. This is the case even in developed nations and is even more so in developing ones where capital
markets are usually unsophisticated and underdeveloped.184
The financial climate became considerably more challenging for
SMEs during the recent global financial crisis when SMEs had fewer
options than their larger more internationally integrated counterparts.185
Higher interest rates and increased collateral requirements were but some
of the tightened credit conditions SMEs faced. The subsequent recovery
has been globally uneven and sector-sensitive in much of the world. For
example, the requirements of Basel III are likely to impact SMEs more
than some other borrowers.186 The extent of the impact will depend on
how a country and its institutions implement the Basel reforms and international standards pertaining to banking supervision and capital requirements. 187 Various Basel requirements could discourage formal banks
from lending to the SME sector, exacerbating the already precarious position of SMEs in accessing formal bank finance.188 This will significantly affect how SMEs perform and evolve.
181. Chauffour & Malouche, supra note 97.
182. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Improving Access to Finance for SMEs: Key to Economic
Recovery (May 2, 2013) (Belg.), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-39
3_en.htm.
183. PEER STEIN ET AL., TWO TRILLION AND COUNTING: ASSESSING THE CREDIT GAP FOR
MICRO, SMALL, AND MEDIUM-SIZE ENTERPRISES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (2010), available at
http://www.mspartners.org/download/Twotrillion.pdf.
184. Chauffour & Malouche, supra note 97.
185. EDINBURGH GRP., supra note 172.
186. ASS’N OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS, FRAMING THE DEBATE: BASEL III AND
SMES (2011), available at http://www.accaglobal.org.uk/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/
small-business/pol-af-ftd.pdf.
187 . See generally RICARDO GOTTSCHALK, BASEL II IMPLEMENTATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND EFFECTS ON SME DEVELOPMENT (2007) (U.K.), available at http://www.ids.ac.uk/
files/gottschalk_ICRIER _paper07.pdf.
188. ASS’N OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 186.
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B. Recommendations for Increasing SME Finance
The primary need of SMEs is for improved access to finance from
the bank and non-bank sectors. Commentators often focus on the need to
develop local capital markets, but the highly developed institutional infrastructure needed for capital markets to function makes their development a major challenge. Furthermore, the high transaction costs associated with equity and bond issuances mean that capital markets are not well
adapted to meet the financing needs of SMEs. Governments should thus
focus on expanding access to bank and non-bank credit.
1. Developing Policies to Encourage SME Lending
Access to finance can be facilitated by expanding bank services in
rural areas, where a large number of SMEs are located. For instance, India initiated a program between 1977 and 1990 that mandated that when
a commercial bank wanted to open a branch in a primary location where
it already had branches, it was required to open four branches in locations where it had no branches.189 This program was based on the premise that commercial financial service providers needed incentives to
move into underserved areas. A later evaluation found that the “1:4 rule”
was largely beneficial in providing increased banking presence in rural
areas and led to an increase in rural credit.190 While there were problems
related to subsidized interest rates and larger than normal loan losses, the
program was perceived as successful in expanding access to finance for
SMEs and lowering the rate of poverty in the areas under study.191 Expanding the physical presence of formal banks has generally been found
to increase the use of banking services by the formerly unbanked.192
Improving the secured transaction regime can significantly enhance
SME finance options by reducing the risk for lenders.193 SMEs typically
do not have the types of assets that most readily serve as adequate collateral: immovable assets. To help facilitate SME growth, a secured transaction regime that can accommodate a broader range of assets is re-

189. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 175, at 108.
190. Id. at 164.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions 1 (2007), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_EbookGuide_09-04-10English.pdf.
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quired.194 Expanding the range of acceptable collateral has been correlated with enhanced economic growth and stability.195
SMEs’ access to finance can also be greatly increased through the
expansion and utilization of leasing and factoring (the discount purchasing of account receivables).196 Factoring depends on the financial condition of the obligor, not the SME. It generates credit from the SME’s
normal business operations rather than from the credit worthiness of the
SME. Reverse factoring is particularly well suited where contract law is
weak and credit information is unavailable or inaccurate.197 Leasing is
also highly advantageous to SMEs in that it secures credit by giving the
financier ownership of the leased equipment. While various types of
leasing and factoring strategies are employed in advanced nations, they
are still greatly underutilized in developing economies. 198 This is due
primarily to weaker legal and regulatory regimes in developing countries.199 SMEs in the developing world will thus benefit greatly from programs that strengthen their nation’s legal and regulatory regimes and introduce effective secured transaction regimes.
Finally, there is a bias within the traditional banking sector that
makes it more difficult for SMEs to secure loans.200 The banking industry
often perceives SMEs to be unstable, particularly in developing economies.201 This perception can be exacerbated by a lack of sound financial
information about the loan applicant and by the fact that small transactions are generally more expensive to service for banking institutions.202
For SMEs to flourish, a change in how they are perceived by the banking
industry is required. The state may need to incentivize lenders (as the
Indian government did in the above example) to encourage them to offer
their financial services to a wider market. SMEs can, with assistance,
become valuable bank customers.
194. Alejandro Alvarez de la Campa, Increasing Access to Credit Through Reforming Secured
Transactions in the MENA Region (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5613, 2011),
available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-5613.
195. Simeon Djankov et al., Private Credit in 129 Countries (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11078, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11078.
196. Leora Klapper, The Role of Factoring for Financing Small and Medium Enterprises, 30 J.
BANKING & FIN. 3111 (2006).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Chauffour & Malouche, supra note 97, at 5; AUGUSTO DE LA TORRE ET AL., THE WORLD
BANK, HOW DO BANKS SERVE SMES? BUSINESS AND RISK MANAGEMENT MODELS (2008), available at https://open knowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/12959.
201. Id.
202. INT’L FIN. CORP., THE SME BANKING KNOWLEDGE GUIDE (2010), available at
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/b4f9be0049585ff9a192b519583b6d16/SMEE.pdf?MOD=AJP
ERES.

2014]

Financial Innovation in East Asia

339

2. Allowing SMEs Access to Public Trading Markets
Another way to increase SME access to finance is by giving them
access to capital markets. An important first step towards improving
SMEs’ access to capital markets would be decreasing the fees associated
with going public. Simplified listing and disclosure requirements for
SMEs would also allow for increased participation.
To expand access to finance for SMEs, some jurisdictions have created SME stock exchanges—separate trading platforms that cater to the
specific needs of SMEs.203 These dedicated stock exchanges, or “junior
markets,” have significantly less stringent eligibility requirements and
considerably lower costs during the IPO underwriting process. 204 The
success of these initiatives overall has been mixed. The performance of
these markets in developing economies, for example, has not been strong,
with many offerings in lower-income countries being unable to attract
financial support.205 In many of these economies, the general population
does not have the capital to support IPOs. Institutional buyers within
these same environments are unlikely to be participants, as very few
SMEs will meet their investment grade criteria. Thus, few SMEs succeed
in capital market raisings.206
The results of such initiatives in middle-income and high-income
countries, however, have been better. MESDAQ in Malaysia, London’s
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), and the MOTHERS market in
Japan have been consistently successful in bringing small cap SMEs to
market.207 Such SME exchanges tend to succeed if (1) there is a sufficiently sophisticated primary market from which the SME market may
draw expertise, and (2) the general market has a track record of supporting IPOs, thus suggesting investors who are qualified and economically
able to support SME fundraising.208 These factors remain a major challenge in developing economies.
Access to finance is perhaps the largest single barrier to SME
growth. 209 While there are many other hurdles SMEs face, most challenges revolve around and come back to resolving the dilemma of financing. Government intervention, regulatory policy, and improvements

203. INT’L FIN. CORP., supra note 178, at 44.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Claire Fargeot, How the Investment Industry Can Facilitate SME Access to Finance in
Europe, CFA INST. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2013/02/22/howthe-investment-industry-can-facilitate-sme-access-to-finance-in-europe/.
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in the legal and financial infrastructure are all needed to foster an environment that promotes financing options for SMEs.
VII. NON-BANK FINANCE
As noted in the previous section, non-bank finance provides a very
important alternative to bank financing in supporting East Asia’s future
development, particularly in the context of the limitations of existing
banking systems. At the same time, the supply of credit by non-bank financial institutions is an area where Asian financial regulators will need
to exercise vigilance. They will need to ensure that the positive impacts
of their regulation exceed the risks of weakening the domestic financial
sector.
A. Growth and Development of Non-Bank Finance in East Asia
Global non-bank finance—often referred to as “shadow banking”—
grew rapidly before the latest financial crisis.210 Rising from US$26 trillion in 2002 to US$62 trillion in 2007, the value of transactions conducted in the shadow banking sector represented about 90% of global GDP
by 2007.211 The global value of transactions conducted by non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) declined slightly with the onset of the global
financial crisis in 2008 but increased subsequently to reach US$67 trillion in 2011 (or about 110% of GDP in the countries monitored by the
FSB).212 Shadow banking transactions represent about half of the value
of assets in the banking sectors of the countries providing information to
the FSB exercise.213
The amount of finance NBFIs provide differs markedly across
Asian countries. Figure 8 shows NBFI assets as a share of total financial
assets in six Asian countries.214 In Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea,
NBFIs play an important role in intermediating the flow of investment
and savings. NBFIs in Indonesia and China play a small role, with their
share of total assets remaining below 10%. Indian NBFIs have increased
the proportion of assets they manage from about 7% in 2002 to a high of
about 15% in 2008.215
210. FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 2012, at 3 (2012),
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121118c.pdf.
211. Id. (share of GDP comes from authors based on nominal GDP in 2007 as reported by the
World Bank).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at Annex 2.
215. We do not report assets managed by specific types of NBFIs—such as insurance companies or finance companies. Such data would not necessarily provide an y additional insight into our
thesis that Asian policymakers need to balance pro-development financial policies with managing
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Figure 8: Non-Bank Financial Institutions' Share of Total Assets Varies Across Asia
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Non-bank finance appears to have played an important role in promoting growth in high-growth jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea.216 Other Asian countries’ NBFI assets represent a relatively negligible share of GDP.
B. Opportunities and Risks Posed by Shadow Banking
The growth of NBFI transactions provides opportunities for Asian
countries’ economic development. Shadow banking has often provided
finance that traditional banking institutions are unable or unwilling to
provide. Many new business ventures have high levels of risk that banks
in many Asian countries have often not felt comfortable servicing. 217
Shadow banking may fill this need—and free up resources—by providing credit extended on a wider range of collateral. 218
On the other hand, the risks posed by shadow banking arrangements are plentiful.219 There are many risks related to the supplying of
the risks of rapid growth in this relatively unregulated sector. We also do not discuss the role of
relatively complex financial products (such as credit default swaps and special purpose vehicles) as
mechanisms for non-bank financial intermediation. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this
paper.
216. Korean bank assets have hovered at about 200% of GDP—illustrating a broader trend in
the larger, developed countries like Japan and Korea that formal banking institutions have succeeded
in providing funding to more generally and thus reduced the need for NBFIs.
217. Risk premia charged by Asian banks may vary not only according to the borrower’s risk
of default but also by the bank’s own ability to price such risk. For a further description of this
mechanism and data from Asia, see Jane-Raung Lin et al., The Determinants of Interest Margins and
Their Effect on Bank Diversification: Evidence from Asian Banks, 8 J. FIN. STABILITY 96 (2012).
218. For more on the impacts of NBFIs on labor and other markets, see JEFFREY CARMICHAEL
& MICHAEL POMERLEANO, THE DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS (2002).
219. For a more in-depth discussion of these risks in an easy-to-digest form, see David Luttrell
et al., Understanding the Risks Inherent in Shadow Banking: A Primer and Practical Lessons
Learned (Fed. Reserve Bank of Dallas, Staff Paper No. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/staff/staff1203.pdf.
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funds to NBFIs. First, depositors may suddenly withdraw their funds.
Second, margins may be lower because NBFIs will need to pay higher
interest to compensate savers for the risks of placing funds with these
under-regulated financial intermediaries. Third, they may face certain
types of counterparty and other risks on assets placed with regulated financial institutions, as they may not have the resources to recover funds
on demand. As such, NBFIs may be the first to liquidate assets at a discount during periods of economic shocks, further depressing asset prices.
Fourth, regulatory changes may affect the supply of funds from traditional banks to NBFIs. Regulators across Asia will apply their own interpretation of the rules promulgated by institutions, like the FSB, about
shadow banking in upcoming years. Many of their responses may tend to
restrict bank lending to NBFIs (and lending by NBFIs themselves). Such
regulatory risk can cause a sudden decrease in liquidity in the shadow
banking sector.
Lending by NBFIs may also increase systemic risk in several ways.
First, it may push up asset prices throughout the economy, such as in real
estate, where prices often depend on the supply of available funds. Second, NBFI lending may lead to widespread maturity duration and other
mismatches as NBFI managers may not have the expertise to match the
duration of funds received and funds lent. This is especially likely in developing parts of Southeast Asia. Third, macroeconomic changes may
cause large classes of NBFI borrowers to disappear. Tightening credit
causes interest rates to rise across all types of lending. NBFIs charge
higher interest rates, partly to cover their own cost of capital and partly to
price in the extra risks of their borrowers. Higher interest rates often correspond to highly elastic demand for funds.
C. Developing Innovative Policy and Regulation Around
Shadow Banking
Regulators need to develop regulations that anticipate the aforementioned risks and help mitigate their economic effects. However,
regulators in many underdeveloped Asian financial markets have not
done so appropriately. India, Indonesia, and Japan provide examples of
regulations that have sought to respond (with greater or lesser success) to
these benefits and risks.
In India, regulators have started to amend highly restrictive regulations with a view toward developing a range of credit markets, both formal and shadow. 220 However, many of the recent amendments do not
220 . Credit Market, RESERVE BANK INDIA (May 31, 2007), http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/
PublicationReportDetails.aspx?ID=502.

2014]

Financial Innovation in East Asia

343

demonstrate a clear consideration of the risks seeking to be mitigated. In
Indonesia, piecemeal law making has scattered laws regulating NBFIs
across a range of legislative and regulatory instruments. Lack of a clear
focus on the potential risks and benefits has resulted in an abstract Action
Plan aimed at consolidating policy across the NBFI sector.221 As a counterexample, Japanese regulation of NBFIs focuses on explicit outcomes
rather than specific measures. This focus has led to the development of a
vibrant NBFI sector. Such an approach also reflects the principles the
FSB has recently promulgated in relation to regulating shadow banking
markets.222
Japan’s regulatory treatment of the capitalization of these NBFIs
shows how Indian regulators could focus more sharply on the gains and
losses they seek to manage. Indian regulators have sought to increase
capitalization requirements of NBFIs for several years. Currently, Indian
legislation requires NBFIs to have a capitalization of at least 2.5 million
rupees.223 Recent recommendations aim (under Section 45NC) to exempt
all non-deposit taking NBFIs from registration requirements if their individual asset sizes fall below 500 million rupees.224 Such a focus on linein-the-sand capitalization floors ignores the risk Indian regulators should
target: the risk of default. As this risk depends on the type of lending, a
more flexible approach should be adopted.
Recent proposals in India aim at taking a regulatory approach focused on balancing risks and returns. Previous regulation focused on
minimum capitalization in order to obtain a registration certificate. Section 45-IA(4)(d) of the Reserve Bank of India Act (1934) requires the
Indian central bank (the RBI) to review an applicant’s capital structure
before granting registration.225 The RBI may impose certain discretionary
requirements with regard to capitalization and assets under management
before registering an applicant (or providing an exemption to registration
under section 45NC of the Act). Demonstrating a firm grip on the underlying rationale for such discretionary power, a recent RBI working group
on reforming NBFI regulations notes, “The spirit behind such exemptions is not to create entry barriers for small innovative players from en221. As we describe below, the Action Plan presents a set of vague policies rather than concrete and specific rules. As such, recent changes to the Indonesian legal framework governing NBFIs
remain at the policy level.
222. FIN. STABILITY BD., SHADOW BANKING: STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION
(2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111027a.pdf.
223. Section 45-IA of the RBI Act (1934) is reported in RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, WORKING
GROUP ON THE ISSUES AND CONCERNS IN THE NBFC SECTOR: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18
(2011), available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/FRWS250811.pdf.
224. Id. at 64 (art. 3.2.i). Other proposals aim at providing certain exemptions from minimum
capital requirements if the NBFI does not take funds from the public.
225. Id. at 20 (section 45-IA(4)(d)).
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tering the NBFC sector especially for lending to small businesses, but to
refocus regulatory resources to where the risks may lie.”226 Nevertheless,
India’s relatively underdeveloped shadow banking sector shows that either not enough entrants have come into the market or they cannot attract
enough capital.
Indonesia’s regulation also tends to overemphasise risk management at the possible expense of national economic development. While
several laws substantially strengthen the regulatory framework governing
NBFIs,227 legislation aimed at regulating Indonesian shadow banking is
scattered across a range of different acts and regulations. Many of these
laws do not directly regulate the credit-creating capacity of NBFIs. In
response, the government has created The Capital Market and Non Bank
Financial Industry Master Plan 2010–2014, which contains a 63-point
Action Plan designed to harmonize these laws.228
The Action Plan aims to encourage both “the expansion of finance
and guarantee institution networks” and “the development of finance and
guarantee products” so as to increase public accessibility.229 It also seeks
to increase “the distribution and quality of information in the NBFI sector.”230 However, the Action Plan is short on concrete details as to how
the government intends to achieve these aims. It does not address the
underlying risks in the Indonesian economy or the scattering of provisions across different legislative instruments. Indeed, it fails to address
any of the fundamental risks facing NBFIs that we discussed at the beginning of this section. There remains a strong need for a coherent institutional framework in Indonesia.
In contrast, Japan has focused on outcomes rather than details. Enshrined in three major pieces of legislation covering usury, the Japanese
legislative framework has sought to focus on usurious practices, particularly in the NBFI sector. The Interest Rate Restriction Act (1954) subjected non-bank financial entities—which had hitherto done business

226. Id. at 20.
227. Notably the Capital Markets Law (CML), No 8/1995, which replaces the Presidential
Decree No. 53/1990 and MOF Decree No. 1548/KMK.013/1990.
228. MINISTRY OF FIN. OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, THE CAPITAL MARKET AND NON
BANK FINANCIAL INDUSTRY MASTER PLAN 2010–2014, at 149–53 (2010), available at
http://www.bapepam.go.id/pasar_modal/publikasi_pm/info_pm/MASTERPLAN_BAPEPAMLK_20
10-2014_ENG.pdf.
229. Id. at 150. We have cited the original objectives from the text, which explains the rather
jargon-laden construction of this sentence.
230. Id. at 150. We take the wording from the plan (from the second part of point 1.2), which
again accounts for the sentence’s clumsy wording.
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virtually without restriction—to regulatory control231 and capped interest
rates at 15%–20%, depending on the loan amount.232 Other laws targeted
potential risks coming from the NBFI sector by capping interest rates at
20%.233 By capping interest rates, the law addressed the risks of default
coming from the non-payment of excessively high interest. It also moved
the focus of regulation from the bank to the borrower and set new net
asset requirements to ensure the viability of the lender. These requirements basically made risk management self-enforcing. Instead of requiring banks to engage in complex risk management practices, these legal
requirements provided strong economic incentives for banks and borrowers to engage in sustainable lending and borrowing practices.
Regulators in Asia still rely excessively on minimizing risks rather
than capturing the development potential of shadow banking. This is particularly so in countries with rapidly developing NBFI sectors, such as
China, India, and Indonesia. Recent FSB guidelines, however, encourage
regulators to focus on broad principles—mostly aimed at promoting the
development of all kinds of finance (including non-bank finance). In
FSB’s view, regulators should focus on five aspects in rulemaking: focus
(target only externalities and risks while avoiding unintentional market
deterioration); proportionality (introduce the lightest possible measures
and not more); being forward-looking and adaptable (predicting market
reactions to things like Basel III); effectiveness (taking into particular
account possible cross-border regulatory arbitrage); and assessment and
review.234 Such a results-oriented focus on rulemaking would likely increase the viability of NBFIs in these developing markets.
The issue of shadow banking illustrates our thesis that regulation
should strike a balance between the need for flexibility (so as to provide
capital for development) and the need to respond rigorously when risks
threaten financial sector development. As we explained, jurisdictions
with larger shadow banking sectors have generally developed quickly
(such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea). Many of the countries with underdeveloped financial markets have tried to tackle the regulation of shadow banking using an administrative approach. We find that
financial regulation in much of developing Asia needs to do a better job
231. Risoku Seigen Ho [Interest Rate Restriction Law], Law No. 100 of 1954 (Japan), available at http://www.asianfinancegroup.com/projects/translation/japanese-legislation/interest-rate-restri
ction-law (unofficial translated version ).
232. Id. at art. 1.
233. Such as Kashikingyō no Kisei nado ni Kansuru Hōritsu [The Money Lending Industry
Regulation Act], Law No. 32 of 1983 (Japan), available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S58/S58H
O032.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
234. The FSB provides eleven recommendations. We do not have the space to provide an
assessment of each country’s performance in adopting each of these recommendations.
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of balancing developmental needs and macroeconomic risks, such as
those inherent in rapidly expanding NBFI sectors. Such risks pose a significant threat to the entire domestic financial sector of these economies.
In developing markets, like China, Malaysia, India, and others, regulations on NBFIs likely impede the growth of this pro-development financial sector. Regulators may want to promote the NBFI sector in these
countries through further—though not unmitigated—financial liberalization. Lastly, the case study of Japan demonstrates how to focus on the
objectives of NBFI regulation rather than micro-regulating. Asian countries looking to expand their shadow banking sectors will do well to balance flexible regulations, which allow for such expansion, and rigorous
regulation, which prevents systemic and other risks building.
VII. MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES
Mobile financial services are provided through mobile phones. A
typical transaction involves a customer going to an agent, such as a local
shopkeeper, to convert some cash into e-money on their phone. The customer does this by paying cash to the agent and seeing a credit appear on
his phone, which is achieved by the agent using his own phone for this
purpose. With this e-money, the customer can then pay bills or remit
funds to others.
About 1.7 billion people have a mobile phone but no bank account.
Mobile phones, therefore, provide a direct conduit to almost one-half of
the world’s unbanked population. The potential of mobile financial services to assist in the alleviation of poverty and to increase efficiency
across an economy has captured the attention of many international financial institutions, including the Asian Development Bank and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a World Bank affiliate.
The groundbreaking success story in mobile financial services occurred in Kenya with the launch of M-PESA in 2007. Within three years,
nearly 40% of Kenya’s adult population used M-PESA.235 A study of the
community impact of M-PESA found that it allowed clients to remit
money to family in times of financial distress.236 It made the conduct of
business easier and safer, and it reduced transaction costs for business
people.237 M-PESA’s success has prompted policymakers in a range of

235. Mudita Tiwari & Deepti K.C., Mobile Payment Systems: What Can India Adopt From
Kenya’s Success?, CONSULTATIVE GRP. TO ASSIST POOR (CGAP) (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.cga
p.org/blog/mobile-payment-systemswhat-can-india-adopt-kenya%E2%80%99s-success.
236 . MEGAN G. PLYLER ET AL., COMMUNITY-LEVEL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF M-PESA IN
KENYA: INITIAL FINDINGS (2012), available at http://www.fsassessment.umd.edu/publications/
pdfs/Comm unity-Effects-MPESA-Kenya.pdf.
237. Id.
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nations to seek to emulate it.238 Mobile financial services are now broadly seen as a way to promote financial inclusion and reduce disadvantage.
The G20 has made financial inclusion a development priority and
has established the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion to implement the G20’s multi-year financial inclusion action plan. 239 This is
strong evidence of how financial inclusion is gathering broad acceptance
as a fundamental development principle.
In East Asia, mobile money is perhaps most advanced in the Philippines. Only two out of ten Filipino households have access to a basic
savings account, but 80% of people have access to a mobile phone.240
The potential of mobile banking to reach a significant portion of the unbanked population in the Philippines is great. The Philippines’ experience has shown that enhancing financial inclusion through the provision
of mobile money services can support political and financial stability and
economic growth. Even the very poor still need to make payments to pay
utilities and other bills and to remit money to families. Financial exclusion means that these payments have to be made in cash, either by the
payees traveling long distances themselves or entrusting their cash to
someone else with all the problems that entails. Either method is tremendously inefficient and time consuming—time that could be used by the
poor in earning an income or in other ways improving their lives.
Regulatory reform in the Philippines has opened up the opportunity
for telecommunication companies (telcos) to compete with banks to deliver mobile money services. This has been a major factor in reducing the
prices of remittances, which is very important given that remittances are
a substantial part of the country’s economy.241
The Philippines has enacted major regulatory changes to promote
financial inclusion.242 The nation does not have a national identification
card, so the regulations have liberalized identification requirements to the
point of certification of identity from a local chieftain being acceptable in
some circumstances. 243 The Philippines has in place a targeted human
development program as a core component of its poverty alleviation

238. Id.
239. About GPFI, GLOBAL P’SHIP FOR FIN. INCLUSION, http://www.gpfi.org/about (last visited
Sept. 30, 2013).
240. Jeanette Thomas, Regulation Spurs Innovation in the Philippines, CONSULTATIVE GRP.
TO ASSIST POOR (CGAP) (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.cgap.org/blog/regulation-spurs-innovationphilippines.
241. External remittances account for about 10% of Filipino GDP, and internal remittances
between workers in urban areas sending money to their family in rural areas are a common feature of
life in the Philippines.
242. Thomas, supra note 240.
243. Id.
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strategy.244 It helps the nation’s poorest families through cash assistance,
provided they meet certain conditions, such as keeping children in school,
attending regular health checkups, and vaccinating their children. 245
Grants were delivered through the banking system as over-the-counter
payments, and in some cases, the government had to hire helicopters to
physically bring the cash to beneficiaries in remote areas. 246 Effective
mobile money programs permit a far more efficient and effective way to
distribute these relatively small payments and to accurately track their
distribution. Beneficiaries in the past used to spend as much as 30% of
their grants on the cost of traveling to collect them, and this does not include the time engaged in travel and queuing to collect the actual
grant.247
A. Regulatory Challenges of Mobile Banking
Mobile money poses many regulatory challenges. The fact that it is
often provided by telcos through a wide array of agents does not sit particularly comfortably with most prudential regulatory agencies. Many
important questions exist: Has a customer who has deposited into his
phone more than the amount needed to make an initial payment actually
made a deposit with the telco of funds, such that the telco needs to be
licensed as a bank? What protects the customer against the risk of fraud
on the part of the agent or the risk of insolvency on the part of the telco?
What “know your customer” rules should apply to telcos operating in
remote areas where customers have no formal identification papers?
Should these regulatory risks be ameliorated by limiting the provision of
e-money services to banks that are appropriately regulated?
What are the roles for banks in e-money services? Should telcos be
required to place their net balance on deposit in a trust account with a
bank each day so that the funds on trust would survive the insolvency of
the telco and be available for distribution to customers? Can the regulator
be confident in the event of the insolvency of the telco that the company’s records would be in a sufficiently good state to permit return of
these funds to their rightful owners?
There are a host of unresolved regulatory issues that different nations are grappling with in different ways. The only clear consensus
seems to be that financial inclusion really matters. The provision of very
244. Chris Bold, GCASH Supports the Philippine Government’s Programs, CONSULTATIVE
GRP. TO ASSIST POOR (CGAP) (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.cgap.org/blog/gcash-supports-philippin
e-government’s-programs.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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basic payments and other financial services to the poor offers them far
more than was widely realized only a few years ago. These financial services save time and money, and allow the poor to spend their days working to better their situation—not laboriously effecting transactions that
take people with access to a bank account just a few minutes.
India is likewise keen to promote the adoption of mobile financial
services because some 40% of its people do not have bank accounts.248 In
addition, the Indian government—like the Filipino government—is implementing targeted human development programs under which specified payments are made to mothers when their children attain certain
milestones, such as regularly attending school or health clinics. The biggest challenge India faces today in implementing such a program is the
accurate and efficient transfer of funds to the poor. Without bank accounts, or some form of mobile e-money, a large proportion of such
payments are lost to corruption or inefficiency. It is therefore ironic that
the RBI has done a poor job of promoting mobile financial services.
Since 2005, the RBI has recommended that banks increase access for the
unbanked population using mobile payment systems. 249 Nonetheless,
regulations in India only permit mobile payments when they are linked to
a registered bank account through which such transactions must take
place.250
Accordingly, in one stroke, the RBI has ensured that mobile money
does not help the unbanked in their country. The intention of this regulation is to protect customers by subjecting mobile payments to the full
panoply of prudential regulation.251 This is an understandable and worthy
regulatory goal, but the price India is paying for it today is far too high.
There is a clear need to rethink the regulation of mobile financial services to provide sufficient protection of customers while allowing this
new technology to assist all Indians who already have access to a mobile
phone but not a bank account.
B. Recommendations Moving Forward
Within the region, the approach of the Philippines should be preferred to that of India. The Philippines has encouraged financial inclusion for its poor and has been very effective in achieving it. India has
prioritized the effective regulation of its system and has maintained regulation accordingly, but at a high human cost. In some nations in East
248. Tiwari & K.C., supra note 235.
249. Id.
250. Id.; see also Mobile Payment in India—Operative Guidelines for Banks, RESERVE BANK
INDIA, http://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/bs_viewcontent.aspx?Id=1365 (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
251. Tiwari & K.C., supra note 235.
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Asia, e-money is not a pressing need. These include the more developed
countries such as Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. But in their
less-developed neighbors, e-money offers a great deal to the large presently unbanked proportions of their population, and it is recommended
that the promotion of financial inclusion be a priority for ASEAN and
other regional organizations. A regulatory handbook that identifies the
various regulatory challenges and analyzes a range of potential responses
to each challenge could most usefully address many of the regulatory
challenges identified above.252 This is an area in which national regulators need assistance now and which the ADB and other like organizations are ideally placed to deliver in a highly efficient way.
IX. CONCLUSION
Financial liberalization has long been associated with economic
growth and development. In the past decade, however, financial crises
have demonstrated the significant risks posed by financial innovations in
the absence of adequate regulation. Such sizable risks mean financial
regulation needs to balance risk with innovation in order to maintain financial stability and support economic growth. This was the approach
largely adopted in East Asia following the Asian financial crisis, which
explains why the major financial centers in the region were much less
affected by the global financial crisis than their Western competitors.
East Asia’s pragmatic, grounded approach to financial regulation is arguably one of the greatest financial innovations of the past decade. It must
be maintained in East Asia, and other regions should be encouraged to
look to and learn from the successes of many Asian economies in this
regard.
We have identified five central areas in which this approach is particularly needed to ensure ongoing financial stability and economic
growth in East Asia. These include trade finance, mortgage markets,
non-bank finance, SME finance, and mobile financial services. While the
region faces a number of challenges in these areas, such challenges can
be overcome through carefully regulated financial innovation.
Trade finance in the region is currently suffering from a retreat by
European banks and the implementation of the Basel reforms. We have
outlined a number of possible solutions that involve collaborative innovations by both the public and private sector. In the area of mortgage
252. The development of such a handbook is the principal goal of a current research project
funded by the Centre for International Finance and Regulation in Sydney. See The Regulation of
Mobile Money–E226, CENTRE INT’L FIN. & REGULATION, http://www.cifr.edu.au/project/The_
Regulation_of_Mobile_Money.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
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markets, an important way forward for East Asia is the enhancement of
institutional and legal frameworks that will support the development of a
robust mortgage finance market. Regulatory reform must aim to strike a
balance between promoting home ownership and preventing inflated real
estate bubbles. SMEs and NBFIs play an important role in financial development, yet both face numerous challenges. Regulators need to focus
on enhancing the access of SMEs to finance and developing a stable nonbank financial sector to assist development and preserve financial sector
stability. Finally, mobile financial services provide the opportunity to
assist in the alleviation of poverty and to increase efficiency across many
developing economies in Asia. While some challenges exist, with careful
regulation, mobile financial services can enhance the lives and productivity of the presently unbanked in the region.
East Asia’s balanced approach to financial innovation and regulation needs to be nurtured and applied across the region in all areas of finance, particularly those outlined above. In the wake of the global and
Eurozone crises, it should also serve as an important example for other
parts of the world. Financial regulation, after all, exists to ensure that
financial sectors serve the needs of the real economy, not the needs or
desires of bankers.

